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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES H. HUPP,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
HONORABLE S. MARK JOHNSON,
Judge of the Circuit Court,
State of Utah, Davis County,
Bountiful Department,

Case No. 16603

Defendant-Respondent.
PETITION FOR REHEARING

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Petitioner contends that the Court erred in its
original determination of this case.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE UTAH SUPREME COURT ERRED IN FINDING ON
APPEAL THAT THE OFFENSES INVOLVED HEREIN DID
NOT CONSTITUTE A "SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE"
UNDER § 76-1-401 ET SEQ. (1953), AS AMENDED

& 76-1-401 defines a "single criminal episode as
follows:
. all conduct which is closely related in time
and is incident to an attempt to an accomplishment
of a single criminal objective.
(Emphasis added.)
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A.

Petitioner's Conduct Constituted Offenses Which
Were Clearly Closely Related in Time
Petitioner respectfully submits that the opinion of

this Court on appeal is contradicto"ry in that in the first
paragraph it states that all four citations were issued at
the same time, while the fifth paragraph states that the
citations charge separage, independent offenses which were
committed at different times.

Certainly all are separate

offenses, as is necessary in order for them to be joined
under the "single criminal episode" statute.

The four

offenses charged were all committed at 1:50 in the morning
of January 5, 1979; and thus, as is conceded in the
Respondent's Appeal Brief on pages 2 and 4, the four
separate violations of the Motor Vehicle Code involved
driving or operating the vehicle and "the conduct of
appellant giving rise to the charges was 'closely related
in time.'"
The Colorado Court of Appeals addressed a similar
question concerning its compulsory joinder statute in Ruth
v. The County Court In and For the County of El Paso, Colo.
App., 563 P.2d 956 (1976).

In that case, plaintiff had

pleaded guilty to operating a vehicle without a valid
operating license, and when separately prosecuted for two
other traffic offenses arising out of the same incident,
asked for a writ of prohibition to prevent the county court
from proceeding further against him.

The date, time, and

location of the offense were the same in each charge, and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the Appeals Court found that where the statute requires
that there must be one prosecution for all offenses "based
on the same act or series of acts arising from the same
criminal episode," that the county court was barred from
separate prosecution of those charges.

The court found

that "the charges alleged in this case were all based on
the violation of state statutes, arise from a single
episode, and were to be prosecuted in the county court.
. . . The compulsory joinder statute requires that
plaintiff be granted the requested relief."

(Emphasis

added.) (For the convenience of the Court, a copy of the
Colorado case has been appended to this Petition for
Rehearing.)
That petitioner's offenses were "closely related in
time" is also confirmed by the California Supreme Court's
finding in In re Hayes, 75 Cal. Rptr. 790, 451 P.2d 430
(1969), that where a motorist was charged with driving
while his license was suspended and driving under the
influence of intoxicating liquor in the same incident, the
offenses occurred simultaneously.

Thus petitioner asks the

Court to correct its opinion and find that the offenses
were closely related in time, both in fact and in law.
B.

Petitioner's Offenses Were Committed Incident
To a Single Criminal Objective
The offenses with which petitioner was charged require,

as an essential element, and indeed have as their only
~

element, the driving of the vehicle.

Further, none

of the offenses herein charged is illegal until such time
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as it is combined with the driving of the vehicle.
Thus, at the time of his arrest, petitioner was
operating his vehicle with the only criminal objective
he could have had under these statutes, the single
criminal objective of operating his vehicle illegally.
"Criminal objective" is to be defined in terms of the
act by which the law is broken, and not by the elements of
the offense which must be proved.
on in In re Hayes, supra.
itself to that part of

§

This position is relied

There the Court was addressing
654 of the California Code which

proscribes multiple punishments for separate offenses
arising under a single criminal episode.

However, in

differentiating the section which precludes multiple
prosecutions in that statute, the California Supreme Court
noted that it had, in People v. Morris in 1965, in a
similar factual situation, declared that § 654 proscribed
multiple prosecutions for drunk driving and an invalid
license.

The Court in Morris, supra, stated that the test

for deciding whether the separate offenses charged amounted
to a single criminal episode was whether the neutral common
act was "essential" to all offenses, rather than requiring
that the common conduct be a "criminal act."

Thus, while

the majority of the Court in In re Hayes found that a
"crimi~al act"

test was proper under the section proscribi~

double punishment, the purposes of the two sections of
the Code were different, and thus that "double prosecution
may be precluded even when double punishment is permissible."
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The Colorado Court of Appeals, in Ruth v. The County
court In and For the County of El Paso, supra, implicitly
agrees with this view when it states that
. . . all such offenses must be prosecuted as a
single prosecution when 'based on the same act
or series of acts arising from the same criminal
episode.'
Offenses not so joined cannot be the
subject of a later prosecution. . • • As to
defendants' assertion that the offenses with which
plaintiff was charged did not possess the requisite
commonality so as to fall within the scope of [the
compulsory joinder statute] we conclude that • • •
the test of identity of issues has been satisfied.
The drafts of the Model Penal Code, and the American
Bar Association, Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice,
Joinder and Severance, both include as alternative standards
for decision on whether joinder is required, those offenses
based on the same "conduct" or those offenses with a
"single criminal objective."

In this instance, petitioner's

conduct fits the language of these drafts.
For an expanded discussion of the optimum scope of
criminal prosecution and the statutory joinder of offenses
for purposes of prosecution, see:

Caraway, "Pervasive

Multiple Offense Problems--A Policy Analysis, "Utah L. Rev.
1971:105 Spr.

'71.

See also, "Note:

Multiple Prosecution

and Punishment of Unitary Criminal Conduct--Minn. Statute
§

609.035," Minn. L. Rev. 56:646 May '71; and Collier,

"Multiple Prosecutions When Conduct Constitutes More Than
One Offense," Ohio N. L. Rev. 2:23-32 '74.
In illustrating its discussion, the Minnesota Law
Review article points out that
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Where several traffic charges result from a
single instance of the operation of an automobile, the defendant's conduct should be
within the scope of a single prosecution • . ,
it is sufficient that the defendant sought to
drive from one place to another, even though
he committed several offenses in doing so.
"Note:

Multiple Prosecution and Punishment of Unitary

Criminal Conduct," supra, at 661.

(Emphasis added.)

Petitioner submits that the definition of "single
criminal episode" has been met.

Because all charges

occurred simultaneously and grew out of a single criminal
objective, they comprise a "single criminal episode"
under & 65-1-401.
POINT II:

§

PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO THE PROTECTION
OF THE STATUTORY BARS RAISED BY § 76-1-402
AND § 76-1-403 (1953) , AS AMENDED

76-1-402(1) and (2) (al (b) provides:

76-1-402.
Separate offenses arising out of a single
criminal episode.--(1) A defendant may be prosecuted
in a single criminal action for all separate offenses
arising out of a single criminal episode; however,
where the same act of a defendant under a single
criminal episode-5°hall establish offenses which may
be punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable
under only one such provision; an acquittal or
conviction and sentence under any such provision bars
a prosecution under any other such provision.
(2)
Whenever conduct may establish separate
offenses under a single criminal episode, unless the
court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant
shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple
offenses when:
(a)
The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a
single court, and
(b)
The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney
at the time the defendant is arraigned on the first
information or indictment.
(Emphasis added.)
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Under the foregoing provisions of§ 76-1-402(1), where the
~ act of the defendant is punishable under different

provisions, a defendant shall be punished under only one
such provision.

The normally innocent act of driving

becomes the only illegal and criminal act of the petitioner
when combined with the other equally innocent acts of
omission and/or commission involved in these charges, and
this one act of driving is the only one which subjects the
petitioner to punishment.

Since he has already been

punished (convicted and sentenced) under three other
statutory provisions for this one act, both his prosecution
and/or punishment under § 41-6-44

tl953), as amended, on a

charge of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence
of intoxicating liquor, is barred.
Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme
Court, in his dissent in In re Hayes, supra, presents a
very well reasoned discussion of the issues underlying
problems involved in the application of statutes barring
punishment for more than one offense arising out of a single
criminal episode.

He asserts that the legislative purpose

behind the California statute was the determination that
"essentially unitary criminal activity shall not be punished
more than once regardless of how many distinct crimes it
may comprise."

(Emphasis added.)

He goes on to find that

the "act" which is made punishable under different provisions
of the Code refers to "conduct significantly common to both,"
and not to the "entire criminal conduct proscribed by each
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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provision."

Further, he continues "petitioner's single

act of driving was an essential element, indeed the only
active element, of the two crimes charged" and that
petitioner was convicted of "a single act of driving while
intoxicated and while his driving privilege was suspended.
It is the singleness of that act which is determinative."
A close reading of Chief Justice Traynor's dissent
and a case-by-case comparison of the dissent with the
majority opinion in In re Hayes can only lead to the
conclusion that Traynor's characterization of "act" for
the purposes of a statute barring multiple punishment of
essentially unitary criminal activity is the correct one.
He closes his dissent with the following observation
It is a strange inversion that a defendant who
commits an act that is the essential and crucial
element of two crimes can be punished twice if
that act by itself is innocent or the defendant's
intent and objective are innocent, but can be
punished only once if the common act or the
intent and objective are criminal.
Petitioner contends that his single act of driving,
which established four offenses which may be punished in
four different ways under the Utah Code, bars punishment
under more than one such provision.

Thus the previous

convictions and sentences bar punishment for the present
charge of driving under the influence of intoxicants,
Should this Court, however, find that for the purposes
of

§

76-1-402, petitioner's conduct did not amount to a

single act and thus bar punishment under more than one
provision, his conduct does fall under the single criminal
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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episode statute and subsequent prosecution is barred by
§

76-1-403, which provides in relevant part
76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent
prosecution for offense out of same episode.-(1}
If a defendant has been prosecuted for one
or more offenses arising out of a single criminal
episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or
a different offense arising out of the same
criminal episode is barred if:
(a)
The subsequent prosecution is for an offense
that was or should have been tried under section
76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution; and

* * *

(ii)

Resulted in conviction . • . lEmphasis added.)

76-1-403(3) defines the term "conviction" as follows:

(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution
resulted in a judgment of guilt that has not been
reversed, set aside, or vacated • • • or a plea
of guilty accepted by the court.
(Emphasis added.)
While the statute only requires a plea of guilty
accepted by the court in its definition of "conviction,"
in this case the pleas of guilty were not only accepted

by the court, but the petitioner was also sentenced on
those charges.
Petitioner has thus met the requirements of § 76-1-403.
CONCLUSION
The Court's sununary disposition of petitioner's appeal
resulted in its incorrectly finding that petitioner's conduct
consisted of offenses which were committed at different
times.· It is clear in this case that all of the offenses
occurred simultaneously.

Defendant's act of driving was

the common element to all the offenses, and the illegal
criminal driving of the vehicle is the sole criminal
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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objective.

Thus petitioner's conduct meets the requirements

defined in the statute for single criminal episode.

All

charges were Class B misdemeanors, all under the jurisdiction
of the Circuit Court, and could and should have been tried
simultaneously.

The petitioner, having entered a plea of,

and been found guilty and sentenced on three of the offenses,
is clearly entitled to the bar contained in § 76-1-401 et seg.
The purpose of the legislature in enacting the "single
criminal episode" statute was to mandate joinder of separate
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode which met
the standards defined by the legislature, and to bar multiple
prosecution for those offenses.

By its refusal to find that

petitioner's offenses are included in § 76-1-401 et seq.,
the Court appears to have thwarted the clear purpose of the
legislature in enacting this legislation and thus judicially
emasculated the single criminal episode statute.
If it is finally determined that the facts of this case
do not come under the prohibitions of § 76-1-401 et seq.,
then after considering this opinion and the previous

decis~M

of the Court on this subject it is difficult, if not impossibli
to imagine a situation where said statute would apply!
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/~

day of February, 1980.

~~·
::RICHARDS~<

Attorney for Peti tioner-Appellar:
15 West Grove Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the

/~day

of February, 1980,

I deposited in the U.S. Mail, first class, postage prepaid,
two true and accurate copies of the foregoing PETITION
FOR REHEARING, addressed to:

ROBERT B. HANSON, Esq.,

Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah
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"A"

563 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

Colo.

the location and installation of basement
doors other than that of providing a child
proof barrier and a properly working latch
is only incidental to the fulfillment of these
purposes. We are constrained to observe
that, as a "barrier" a door is designed to be
opened, else a wall would suffice. Thus, we
reject the trial court's finding and conclusion as not supported by the evidence, see
Anderson v. Cold Spring Tungsten, Inc., 170
C-Olo 7, 458 P.2d 756; Holland Furnace Co.
v. Robson, 157 Colo. 347, 402 P.2d 628. We
do not, therefore, find it necessary to consider whether the parties intended the applicable policy section as a separate insurable risk or as an exclusion from the policy.
Cf. Jorgensen "· St. Paul Insurance Co.,
supra.
[3] In considering the meaning of a
written contract, the entire instrument
should be considered, and meaning should
be given to each provision of the agreement. Gn"mes v. Barndollar, 58 Colo. 421,
148 P. 256; New Brantner Extension Ditch
C-0. v. Kramer, 57 Colo. 218, 141 P. 498.
The "completed operations hazard" provision should therefore be interpreted in such
a way as to give significance to each of its
clauses.
[4] In the context of this case, the import of the last sentence of the provision at
is;ue is that the defective latch did not
prevent the basement door from being put
to its intended use. Thus, the door comes
within the area of completed operations and
therefore injuries suffered as a result of the
improper installation of the door latch are
not covered by the policy.
Judgment reversed.
SILVERSTEIN, C. J., and PIERCE, J.,
cc,nc:ur.

0

r

.~,,..,,-u.-...-,,-,1-,.~

Joseph R. RUTH, Plaintiff-Appellant.
v.

The COUNTY COURT IN AND FOR the
COUNTY OF EL PASO, and Judge
James Quine, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 76-172.
Colorado Court of Appeals,
Div. I.
Dec. 16, 1976.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 6, 1977.
Certiorari Granted May 9, 1977.

Plaintiff who had entered plea of
guilty to operating vehicle without valid
operator's license sought relief in nature of
writ of prohibition to preclude county court
from proceeding further against him on
traffic charges involving the same date,
time and location. The District Court, El
Paso County, William Rhodes, J., entered
order dismissing the complaint and plaintiff
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Coyte, J.,
held that: (1) if the offenses sought to be
tried are within the circumscription of joinder statute, then trial court jurudiction is
lacking and a writ of prohibition may prop-,
erly issue; (2) plaintiff who had pleaded .
guilty to the licensing offense had been
subjected to prosecution within purview of
joinder statute and any further proceedings
would constitute a "subsequent" prosecu- ,
tion impermissible under the statute; (3)
the licensing offense and charges that
plaintiff had improperly backed his vehicle
and struck another vehicle and that he left.,
the scene of the accident without attempting to notify the owner of the second vehi- ·
cle or making a report of the incident were
not separate and distinct by reason of the
applicability of both municipal and state.
law.
Reversed and remanded.

T

l. Prohibition =5(4)
·-.Prohibition may properly issue in a
criminal
proceeding.
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Cite as,, Colo.App .. 563 P.2d 956

2. Prohibition <= 10(3)
If offenses sought to be tried are within the circumscription of statute requiring
that all offenses must be prosecuted as a
single prosecution when based on the same
act or series of acts arising from the same
criminal episode, then trial court jurisdiction is lack;ng and writ of prohibition may
properly issue. C.R.S. '73, 18-1-408(2).

3. Criminal Law <=273.2(1)
A guilty plea entered in good faith has
the same effect as the verdict rendered by a
jury.

4. Criminal Law <11=200(1)
Plaintiff who had pleaded guilty to operating vehicle without valid operator's
license had been subjected to prosecution
within purview of statute requiring that all
offenses must be prosecuted as a single
prosec•;tion when based on the same act or
seri : .,f acts arising from the same criminai
;ode, and any further proceedings
agJ..
plaintiff on traffic offense charges
invoi" ing the same date, time and location
as the lic~nsing offense, would constitute a
"subsequent" prosecution impermissible under the statute. Rules of Civil Procedure,
rule 106(a)(4); C.R.S. '73, 18-1-408(2), 422-101, 42-4-112, 42-4-1404.

5. Indictment and Information <= 129(1)
Purpose of statute providing that all
offenses must be prosecuted as a single
prosecution when based on the same act or
series of ects arising from the same criminal episode is to provide safeguards against
harassment of defendants and unfair prosecutorial advantage. C.R.S. '73, 18-1-408(2).
6. Indictment and Information <= 129(1)
Concerns of public policy, such as
avoidance of costly and repetitive trials as
well as notions of constitutional due process, require that statute providing that all
offenses must be prosecuted as a single
prosecution when based on the same act or
series of acts arising from the same criminal episode be construed so as to effectuate
the discernible objectives. C.R.S. '73, 18-1408(2).

7. Criminal Law <=200(1)
When prosecutor reasonably should be
aware of separate charges against a defendant arising from the same Criminal episode,
the failure to prosecute all charges in a
single action forecloses any further proceedings. C.R.S. '73, 18-1-408(2).

=

8. Criminal Law
129(1)
Charges that defendant improperly
backed his vehicle and struck another vehicle, that he left scene of accident without
attempting to notify owner of the second
vehicle or making a report of the incident,
and operating vehicle without valid operator's license, which charges arose from a
single episode, were not separate and distinct by reason of applicability of both municipal and state law and statute requiring
joinder of all charges was applicable. Rules
of Civil Procedure, rule 106(a)( 4); C.R.S. '73,
18-1-408(2). 42-4-101, 42-4-112, 42-41404.

MacLaughlin, Ciccolella & Barton, John
B. Ciccolella, Colorado Springs, for plaintiff-appellant.
Robert L. Russel, Dist. Atty., James M.
Franklin, Deputy Dist. Atty., Colorado
Springs, for defendants-appellees.
COYTE, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals a district court order
dismissing his complaint wherein he requested relief in the nature of a writ of
prohibition. We reverse.
Plaintiff was charged in El Paso County
Court on two different occasions with offenses arising under the Motor Vehicle
Law. The first action, consisting of two
counts, was filed on January 20, 1975. The
charges alleged that plaintiff had improperly backed his vehicle and struck another
vehicle, and that he left the scene of the
accident without attempting to notify the
owner of the second vehicle or making a
report of the incident. See §§ 42-4-112
and 42-4-1404, C.R.S.1973. Plaintiff entered a plea of not guilty to these charges
and the matter was set for trial.
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On February 7, 1975, plaintiff was
charged in the same county court in a separate proceeding with the offense of having
operated a vehicle without a valid operator's license in violation of § 42-2-101, C.R.
S.1973. The date, time, and location specified in the charge were the same as those
described in the first complaint. Plaintiff
pied guilty to this latter offense and sentence was imposed.
Plaintiff thereafter moved in the county
court for dismissal of the charges scheduled
for trial, which motion was denied. He
subsequently commenced the present litigation seeking to prohibit the county court
from proceeding further against him.

I.
The initial question presented by this appeal is whether relief in the nature of prohibition, see C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4), is an appropriate remedy under the circumstances. We
conclude that it is.
The basis upon which plaintiff asserts his
claim for relief is the compulsory joinder
statute, § 18-1-408(2), C.R.S.1973, which
provides that if several offenses are known
to a district attorney at the commencement
of prosecution, all such offenses must be
prosecuted as a single prosecution when
"based on the same act or series of acts
arising from the same criminal episode."
Offenses not so joined cannot be the subject
of a later prosecution.
(1) Defendants concede that prohibition
may properly issue in a criminal proceeding,
Bustamante v. District Court, 138 Colo. 97,
329 P.2d 1013 (1958), but maintain that the
trial court here possessed the requisite subject matter jurisdiction, and that accordingly, plaintiff's remedy is limited to an appeal
of the judgment entered in that criminal
case. See People v. District Court, Colo.,
541 P.2d 683 (1975). We conclude that the
defect in this proceeding is one which deprives the county court of jurisdiction.
In Bustamante v. District Court, supra,
our Supreme Court held that statutes of
limitations in criminal cases operate as a
bar to prosecution and are jurisdictional in
nature. Therefore, the Supreme Court

pointed out, a trial of a charge barred by a
statute of limitation would be a "useless
act" and an unnecessary expense to the
public.
(2) Similar considerations underlie the
construction of a joinder statute. In pr<>viding that offenses not properly joined.
cannot be a basis for subsequent prosecution, the legislature has explicitly surrendered the right to prosecute, as occurs with
respect to statutes of limitation. Busta-··

man te v. District Court, supra; see generally 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 154. The: ·
circumstances here are thus distinguishable
from those cases in which the remedy of
prohibition is denied when the adjudicative
tribunal acts within its jurisdiction. See, e. ·
g., Leonhart v. District Court, 138 Colo. 1,
329 P.2d 781 (1958); Colorado State Board
of Medical Examiners v. District Court, 138
Colo. 227, 331 P.2d 502 (1958). Consequently, if the offenses sought to be tried are
within the circumscription of§ 18-1-408(2),
C.R.S.1973, then trial court jurisdiction is
Jacking and a writ of prohibition may properly issue.

II.
Asserting that plaintiff entered a guilty
plea to the licensing offense in order to ·
avoid subsequent prosecution, that the district attorney had no knowledge of the-· ··•
guilty plea, that the prosecution pending here is not "subsequent," and that different .
evidence will be required to prove the alle:: · '':·
gations in the two complaints, defendants• '"·.·_'
contend that § 18-1-408(2), C.R.S.1973, · · ·:-'
does not bar prosecution of plaintiff for tbe·;.:\
offenses charged under §§ 42-4-112 and, ;·,
42-4-1404, C.R.S.1973. These argumen_ts :; ~.
are unpersuasive_
_-~ .i_~~..
""'::~

(3, 4] Defendants admit that plaintiff • 1;.·
did not act in a fraudulent manner in enter-· ..
ing the plea of guilty, but argue however,·
that the conviction was the result of collu- 0
-}.:
sion or connivance, which conduct should · ~·
estop plaintiff frcm asserting the matter of<=(i:·
joinder. However, the ·authority relied~~';'.
upon by defendants in support of this prop-.:.?'_'"':.
osition, i. e., Hampton v. Municipal Court,··::•·
242 CaLApp.2d 689, 51 Cal.Rptr. 760 (Dist.+<:·:. '

.°'

~~!
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Ct.App.1966), relates to the defense of double jeopardy raised by one who procured a
prior conviction by fraud for the purpose of
avoiding a greater punishment. See Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 683. In contrast, a guilty
plea entered in good faith has the same
effect as a verdict rendered by a jury.
Markiewicz v. Black, 138 Colo. 128, 330 P.2d
539 (1958). Thus, under the circumstances
present here, plaintiff has been subjected to
prosecution within the purview of § 18-1408(2), C.R.S.1973, and any further proceedings would constitute a "subsequent" prosecution impermissible under the statute.

the compulsory joinder statute requires that
plaintiff be granted the requested relief.
The order denying prohibition is reversed
and the cause remanded with directions to
enter an order granting the writ in the
nature of prohibition.

[&-7] The purpose of joinder statutes is
to provide safeguards against harassment
of defendants and unfair prosecutorial advantage. People v. Cooks, 186 Colo. 44, 525
P.2d 426 (1974); and see Kellett v. Superior
Court, 63 Cal.2d 822, 48 Cal.Rptr. 366, 409
P.2d 206 (1966). Additional concerns of
public policy, such as the avoidance of costly and repetitive trials as well as notions of
constitutional due process, see Ciucci v. 11/inois, 356 U.S. 571, 78 S.Ct. 839, 2 L.Ed.2d
983 (1958), require that these enactments be
construed to as to effectuate their discernible objectives. Here, the district attorney
maintained a file consisting of information
forwarded by the court, and when a prosecutor reasonably should be aware of separate charges against a defendant arising
from the same criminal episode, the failure
to prosecute all charges in a single action
forecloses any further proceedings. See
Weaver v. Schaaf, 520 S.W.2d 58 (Mo.1957).

Sophronia J. JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant,

As to defendants' assertion that the offenses with which plaintiff was charged did
not possess the requisite commonality so as
to fall within the scope of § 18-1--408(2),
C.R.S.1973, we conclude that, under the pertinent authority in this jurisdiction, the test
of identity of issues has been satisfied.
(8] The charges alleged in this case
were all based -on the violation of state
statutes, arise from a single episode, and
were to be prosecuted in the county court.
The offenses, therefore, are not separate
and distinct by reason of the applicability of
both municipal and state law. See People
v. Pinyan, Colo., 546 P.2d 488 (1976). Thus

ENOCH and STERNBERG, JJ., concur.

o

w._____,
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v.
Kurt W. KRISTENSEN and Regional
Transportation District,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 76-234.
Colorado Court of Appeals,
Div. I.
Jan. 13, 1977.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 24, 1977.
Certiorari Granted May 9, 1977.
Motorist, whose car was struck from
the rear by another car after it had been
rear-ended by regional transportation district's bus, brought action to recover
against district and its employee-bus driver.
The District Court, City and County of Denver, Mitchel B. Johns, J., dismissed complaint for failure to file 90-day notice provided for in Governmental Immunity Act,
and motorist appealed. ' The Court of Appeals, Enoch, J., held that (1) fact that
district and its insurer were aware of accident and that they had made their own
investigation of it did not constitute substantial compliance by plaintiff in regard to
notice requirements of Act; (2) defendants
were not equitably estopped from contending that motorist failed to file the notice
required under Act; (3) fact that district
carried liability insurance did not render
notice requirements of Act inapplicable; (4)
failure of motorist to comply with notice
requirements did not preclude motorist
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